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CHAPTER 3 
Security and Mortgages 
GEORGE P. DAVIS 
§3.1. Joint obligees: Bills and notes. In Marlboro Supply, Inc. v. 
Webb Supply CO.I the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the question 
of the enforcement of notes when the joint payees of the notes disagree 
on the question of whether the notes should be immediately enforced. 
The defendant Franchi was the sole proprietor of a plumbing business. 
The plaintiff Marlboro and the defendant Webb were competing 
dealers in the plumbing supply business. Franchi was in financial dif-
ficulties. Webb received a real estate mortgage from Franchi to secure 
a note dated January 2, 1962, for $39,240.00, the then current balance 
of Franchi's indebtedness to Webb. Franchi also owed a substantial 
indebtedness to Marlboro. As the result of conferences between Franchi, 
Marlboro, and Webb, an agreement was executed under date of 
June 15, 1963. The note of January 2, 1962, was divided between the 
two creditors, Webb assigning to Marlboro an undivided one-half 
interest in the note and mortgage. 
Franchi executed a promissory note dated May 23, 1963, for 
$74,285.04 to the order of Marlboro and Webb with 6 per cent in-
terest payable "on or before October I, 1963." At this time the in-
debtedness of Franchi was $23,944.31 to Marlboro and $50,340.73 to 
Webb, making a total of $74,285.04, which served as the basis of the 
new note. Marlboro and Webb agreed that these amounts were correct 
and that "out of each and every dollar or portion thereof that may 
at any time hereafter be realized as a result of and in payment of the 
... [$74,285.04] note ... [two thirds] is to be allocated to and paid to 
'Webb' ... [one third] to 'Marlboro.' "2 The two creditors also agreed 
that they would maintain the same ratio in making sales to Franchi 
and that neither would do or suffer anything to cause Franchi to be 
declared a bankrupt "up to and including October I, 1963." 
After October I, 1963, Marlboro sought to enforce the note for 
$74,285.04. Webb refused to co-operate, asserting that it would be 
better not to force liquidation, but to keep Franchi in business and 
obtain a larger return later. Marlboro brought a bill in equity seeking 
to compel Webb to join with Marlboro in collecting the note and in 
foreclosing the mortgages and other securities, or, in the alternative, to 
GEORGE P. DAVIS is partner in the firm of Nutter, McClennan &: Fish, Boston. He 
is author of the Massachusetts Conveyancers' Handbook (1956). 
§3.1. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1513,213 N.E.2d 248, also noted in §6.6 infra. 
2Id. at 1514, 213 N.E.2d at 249. 
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§3.2 SECURITY AND MORTGAGES 33 
cause a partition to be made of the notes, mortgages, and securities 
with a view to immediate collection of the money Franchi owed to 
Marlboro. The trial court dismissed the bill but was reversed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
Webb relied upon Section 3·116 of the Uniform Commercial Code,S 
which provides that "an instrument payable to the order of two or 
more persons ... if not in the alternative is payable to all of them 
and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them." 
Marlboro in turn argued its case on the basis of General Laws, Chapter 
214, Section3, which provides that "the supreme judicial and superior 
courts shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction in equity of the 
following cases: ... (3) Other cases in which three or more parties 
have distinct rights or interests which cannot be justly and definitely 
decided and adjusted in one action at law." The Court held that this 
section was not repealed by Section 3-116 of the Code and, therefore, 
the plaintiff action would lie. 
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, 
by virtue of the creditors' agreement of June 15, 1963, the obligations 
of Franchi became absolutely due and payable on October I, 1963, 
and that Webb as a joint payee had no right to refuse to join in the 
enforcement of the notes and obligations. The proper course to be 
followed was, therefore, to order Webb to join with Marlboro in en-
forcing the notes and security according to their terms.4 
§3.2. Mortgage foreclosure: Accounting. In Bennett .v. Worcester 
County National Bank1 Azniv Realty Trust in February, 1962, gave 
the defendant bank a first mortgage on a fifteen-acre lot to secure the 
payment on August I, 1962, of a note for $155,000. The mortgage was 
"also to secure the performance of all the terms and conditions of a 
certain Construction Loan Agreement of even date," between Azniv 
and the bank, and the mortgage provided that breach of the construc-
tion agreement would also constitute a breach of the mortgage. The 
construction loan agreement provided that Azniv was to construct a 
shopping plaza on the land described in· the mortgage and further 
provided that 
[in] the event the contractor fails to complete the construction 
of the building within a reasonable time, Bank shall thereupon 
have the right but shall not be bound to take immediate posses-
sion of said premises and proceed to complete the building ... and 
Bank is authorized to charge all money expended for said com-
pletion against any payments not already advanced.2 
A breach of any of the covenants or conditions of the agreement would 
3 G.L., c. 106, §3-116. 
4 See Webster v. Vandeventer, 6 Gray 428 (1856); 30 C.J.S., Equity §38, p. 844 
(1965 Replacement). 
§3.2. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 19, 213 N.E.2d 254. 
2Id. at 20, 213 N.E.2d at 255. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1966 [1966], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1966/iss1/6
34 1966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §3.3 
release the bank from its obligation and permit it to exercise the 
power of sale contained in the mortgage. The real estate involved was 
not to be further encumbered except with the written consent of the 
bank. 
In May, 1962, Azniv gave a second mortgage on the property to the 
plaintiffs to secure aloan of $10,000. The mortgage was made subject 
to the bank's mortgage, but the consent of the bank was neither sought 
nor granted. In July, 1962, the bank decided to foreclose its mortgage 
and filed a petition in court for leave to do so. At this time $133,608.98 
had been advanced by the bank under the construction loan agree-
ment. The bank advertised the sale of the land and the uncompleted 
building, but the best offer it received was $95,000.00. Rejecting this 
offer, the bank completed the building itself at an expense of 
$60,643.51. The property was subsequently sold by foreclosure for 
$186,000. After deducting the amount advanced to Azniv under the 
note, the completion expense, interest and other expenses, the bank 
had a net loss of $14,290.22. No part of the proceeds of the sale was 
distributed to the plaintiffs who made demand for an accounting of 
$12,600.00, as the amount owing on the second mortgage. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim for pay-
ment of their second mortgage out of the proceeds. The plaintiffs 
contended that upon Azniv's breach of the mortgage by failure to 
complete the building, the bank's obligation to advance money for the 
project ceased. Thus, it was argued, the bank became a "volunteer" 
as to any sums subsequently advanced,s and its recovery should be 
limited to the sum of $133,608.93, the amount advanced up to the 
time of the mortgagor's breach. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument, pointing out 
that the bank expressly reserved the right to complete the building 
and that Azniv's failure to complete the building violated a covenant, 
the performance of which was secured by the mortgage. The Court also 
rejected the argument that the bank's recovery was limited to the 
sum of $150,000, being the original indebtedness under the note. The 
language of the mortgage made dear that it was executed to secure 
not only repayment of the note, but also performance of all of the 
terms of the construction loan agreement.4 
§3.3. Mortgage foreclosure: Advance agreement by mortgagee with 
purchaser. In Manoog v. Miele1 the Supreme Judicial Court con-
sidered the rights of a mortgagee to make agreements with a prospec-
tive purchaser prior to a foreclosure sale. The defendants on December 
S Comeau v. F.S. Friend Mortgage Corp., 285 Mass. 310, 315, 189 N.E. 60, 62 (1934). 
4 The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs were aided by G.L., c. 183, 
§28A, which provides that any sums "loaned by the mortgagee to the mortgagor" 
to be expended for repairs, improvements, taxes or liens, etc. are secured with the 
same priority as the original indebtedness "to the extent that the aggregate amount 
outstanding at anyone time when added to the balance due on the original indebt-
edness shall not exceed the amount originally secured by the mortgage." 
§3.3. 1350 Mass. 204, 213 N.E.2d 917 (1965). 
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4, 1958, executed a $45,000 note secured by a mortage on certain 
parcels of real estate. Following a default and notice of his intention to 
foreclose,2 the plaintiff took possession of the premises on October 23, 
1962. On October 26, 1962, 19 days before the foreclosure sale, the 
plaintiff entered into an agreement with Barber for the sale of the 
property described in the mortgage. Barber gave the plaintiff a $2000 
deposit and contracted to purchase the premises from him for $45,000, 
subject, however, to the acquisition of title by the plaintiff at the fore-
closure sale. The agreement further provided that the plaintiff was to 
receive from Barber a ten-year mortgage in the sum of $35,000 at 6 
per cent interest and was to pay a broker's commission. Before the 
foreclosure sale, the plaintiff permitted Barber to occupy the premises 
and to bring trucks upon the property. 
At the foreclosure sale, held on November 14, 1962, there were 
seven or eight people in attendance including Barber. The auctioneer 
made a general solicitation for bids. The plaintiff was the sole bidder 
and purchased the property for $40,000. Some time thereafter, the 
plaintiff sold the land to Barber for $45,000 and brought suit against 
the defendant for the deficiency on the mortgage note. The defendant 
claimed that the plaintiff's agreement with Barber voided any de-
ficiency. Thus, he argued the plaintiff had improperly "chilled".Yt;he 
sale by bidding $40,000 when prior to the sale he had entered into an 
agreement to sell the property for $45,000, and also by agreeing to 
give Barber a second mortgage. 
The trial court left the question to the jury to determine whether 
the plaintiff had improperly "chilled" the sale or used bad faith. The 
court instructed the jury that the mortgagee must act in good faith 
and use reasonable diligence to protect the interests of the mortgagor.4 
However, the court noted that when the mortgagee has done his full 
duty to the mortgagor in his conduct of the sale and the bidding begins, 
the mortgagee in his capacity as a bidder may buy as cheaply as he 
can and was under no duty to bid the full value of the property.5 The 
jury assessed a deficiency of $5488.67 against both defendants. This 
figure reflected the total of the unpaid balance of the note, unpaid 
interest thereon to the date of sale, taxes paid by the plaintiff, and the 
costs of sale with credits to the defendants for rents received by the 
plaintiff prior to the sale and such amounts as they had prepaid for 
the real estate taxes. 
2 See C.L., c. 244, §17B. 
11 See Lexington Trust Co. c. McCabe, 313 Mass. 733, 735, 49 N.E.2d 435, 436 
(1943); Cambridge Savings Bank v. Cronin, 289 Mass. 379, 383, 194 N.E. 289, 290-291 
(1935). 
4 Cohen v. Bay State Cafe, Inc., 341 Mass. 1, 5, 166 N.E.2d 908, 910-911 (1960); 
Andover Savings Bank v. Basha, 326 Mass. 725, 727, 96 N.E.2d 700, 701 (1951); West 
Roxbury Co-operative Bank v. Bowser, 324 Mass. 489, 492, 87 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1949); 
Union Market National Bank v. Derderian, 318 Mass. 578, 581-582, 62 N.E. 2d 661, 
662-663 (1945); Cambridge Savings Bank v. Cronin, 289 Mass. 379, 383, 194 N.E. 
289, 290-291 (1935). 
5 See cases cited in note 4 supra. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court overruled the defendant's exceptions 
and upheld the verdict, stating that under all the circumstances the 
question of good faith on the part of the mortgagee was a question of 
fact for the jury to decide. The Court cautioned that a mortgagee will 
not be permitted to indicate in advance to other potential bidders 
that it is his intention to bid a price beyond a reasonable figure at the 
foreclosure sale, unless they agree to purchase the property at the 
foreclosure sale at a price which is unreasonably low. On the other 
hand, the law must not discourage the mortgagee from dealing prior 
to the foreclosure sale with persons who might otherwise not be in-
terested in the property. A smaller deficiency to be met by the mort-
gagor may well be occasioned by a mortgagee's knowledge of the 
availability of a person who will purchase from the mortgagee sub-
sequent to the mortgagee's acquisition of title at the foreclosure sale.6 
§3.4. Second mortgage: Extension of first mortgage. In Guleserian 
v. Fields1 the plaintiffs were mortgagors under a first mortgage to 
Charlestown Savings Bank, securing payment of $750,000 in 15 years. 
The debt was payable in monthly installments of $6,249.99, consisting 
of a payment on principal and also interest at the rate of 6 per cent 
per annum on the unpaid principal balance. The plaintiff mortgagors 
sought the consent of the second mortgagee to a proposed agreement 
between the plaintiffs and the first mortgagee, which would extend 
the terms of payment of principal under the first mortgage by post-
poning the next two years' principal payments until October 15, 1975, 
the stated maturity date of the first mortgage note, all of the postponed 
principal payments becoming payable in a lump sum on that date. 
Interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum as specified in the note 
would continue to be paid monthly on the outstanding balance. The 
second mortgagee refused to consent to this arrangement and notified 
the plaintiffs that if such an agreement were made with the bank the 
second mortgagee would demand that the mortgagors continue to pay 
the bank monthly installments according to the original tenor of the 
first mortgage note, and would take the position that failure to make 
such payments would constitute a default under the terms of the 
second mortgage. The second mortgagee also contended that such an 
extension agreement would not be binding on it, would constitute a 
violation of its rights as holder of the second mortgage, and would 
affect the priorities as between the holders of the first and second mort-
gages. 
The plaintiff mortgagors then brought a bill for declaratory judg-
ment2 seeking a declaration that any lawful extension of the terms 
of payment of the first mortgage note made without the consent of the 
second mortgagee would not constitute a breach by the mortgagors 
of the condition of the second mortgage. The Supreme Judicial Court 
6 See Dexter v. Shepard, 117 Mass. 480, 485·486 (1874). 
§3.4. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1111, 218 N.E.2d 397. also noted in §I.l supra. 
2 G.L., c. 231A. 
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held that the proposed extension agreement would in no way con-
stitute a breach of the second mortgage, even if the second mortgagee 
refused its consent. The proposed extension would in no way increase 
the risk or burden on the second mortgagee. There would be no in-
crease in the interest rate payable upon the balance of principal from 
time to time due upon the mortgage note. That rate was fixed at 6 per 
cent per annum in the original note and remained at the same rate 
under the terms of the proposed extension agreement. 
The only change proposed in the terms of the first mortgage note 
would be that the monthly payments of principal coming due within 
the period of 24 months following the execution of the extension 
agreement would be postponed until the maturity date of the note. 
There would be no increase, by reason of the extension agreement, in 
the principal amount owed upon the first mortgage at the date of the 
execution of the extension agreement. Thus the only adverse effects, 
so far as the second mortgagee would be concerned, of the extension 
agreement would be that the first mortgage debt would not be reduced 
as rapidly as the parties to the first mortgage and note originally had 
agreed, and interest would be paid upon the amount of the postponed 
principal payments for a longer period than was originally contem-
plated. 
The general rule is that a renewal or extension of an existing senior 
mortgage and the note or other obligation secured thereby, without 
an increase of the principal or interest payable with respect to the 
secured indebtedness, will not result in any loss of priority of that 
senior mortgage over junior encumbrances.s The holder of the junior 
encumbrance is regarded as necessarily taking the risk of a postpone-
ment (frequently an advantage to a second mortgagee) of the date 
of payment of the whole or part of the senior mortgage debt.4 
In reaching its decision in this case, the Court noted that General 
Laws, Chapter 168, Section 36, par. 4, authorizes savings banks to make 
certain changes in the amount of periodic payments under mortgages. 
The existence of this provision has the effect of drawing the attention 
of junior lien holders to the possibility that the holder of a savings 
bank mortgage may wish to extend the debt secured by a mortgage of 
which the savings bank is a holder. 
Part of the statutory condition included in the second mortgage II 
provides that the mortgagors "shall perform the condition of any 
S Lomas & Nettleson Co. v. Isacs, 101 Conn. 614, 622, 127 Atl. 6, 9 (1924); Schwartz 
v. Smith, 143 App. Div. 297, 300-301, 128 N_Y. Supp. 1, 3-4 (1911), afJ'd, 207 N.Y. 
714, 101 N.E. 1121 (1913); Roberts v_ Doan, 180 Ill. 187, 189-190, 54 N.E. 207, 208-
209 (1899). 
4 Piea Realty Co_ v_ Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 244, 249, 172 N.E.2d 841, 844, 
847 (1962); North Easton Co-operative Bank v_ MacLean, 300 Mass. 285, 288-289, 
292-294, 15 N.E.2d 241, 243-244, 245-246 (1938)_ But d. Houle v. Vallieres, 281 Mass. 
123, 124-125, 183 N.E. 259 (1932). See also Barbano v. Central Hudson Steamboat 
Co., 47 F.2d 160, 162-163 (2d Cir. 1931); Commonwealth Life Insurance Co. v. 
Louisville Railway, 234 Ky. 802, 806, 809-810, 29 SoW .2d552. 554-555, 555-556 (19110). 
II G.L .• c. 183 §20. 
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prior mortgage." This would, of course, extend to the second mort-
gagee the opportunity to foreclose the second mortgage in the event of 
any breach of the first mortgage which would permit foreclosure of 
the first mortgage by the bank as first mortgagee. When, however, an 
extension agreement prevents a breach of the prior mortgage, there 
will be no breach of the junior mortgage. 
The Court, in rejecting the claims of the second mortgagee, pointed 
out that if extensions of the first mortgage are objectionable to the 
second mortgagee, the remedy is to include in the second mortgage 
an express condition that the mortgagors must continue, without any 
extension or postponement, to pay the installments of principal and 
interest on the first mortgage note. If this had been done, postpone-
ment of any such payments by the proposed extension agreement 
would constitute a breach of the special condition of the second mort-
gage and would have protected the second mortgagee in its objections 
to the proposed extension agreement. 
§3.5. Security interest: Perfection by filing. In Prime Business Co. 
v. Drinkwater1 the plaintiff on March 18, 1963, loaned Vivace $2000, 
giving him a check and taking a note for $2250 secured by a chattel 
mortgage on a bulldozer. Financing statements under the Uniform 
Commercial Code were recorded some three months later in the office 
of the city clerk in Salem. On September 26, 1963, Vivace, who owed 
the defendant $200, sold the bulldozer to the defendant in payment 
of the debt. In October, 1963, the plaintiff's assistant treasurer told 
the defendant that the plaintiff had a chattel mortgage on the bull-
dozer. On November 19, 1963, the plaintiff served the defendant with 
a written demand for the bulldozer. 
The defendant testified that in his opinion the bulldozer was worth 
approximately $50 at the time of the plaintiff's demand for the bull-
dozer and that the defendant thereafter expended $750 in parts and 
$350 in labor in repairing it. The plaintiff offered evidence that in its 
opinion the bulldozer was worth between $3500 and $4000 on Novem-
ber 19, 1963, when the plaintiff sought its return. The trial court 
found that the defendant had converted the bulldozer and gave a 
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $2400, adopting a valua-
tion of $3500 for the bulldozer, being the plaintiff's lowest estimate 
of the value of the bulldozer following repairs, and giving the de-
fendant an allowance of $1l00 for the repairs made by the defendant. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that a valid security interest had 
attached to the bulldozer prior to its purchase by the defendant and 
that, although there was a three months' delay in filing the financing 
statement, the defendant was on notice of the security interest since 
the financing statement had been filed before the defendant's purchase 
of the bulldozer. 
In overruling the defendant's exceptions and upholding the finding 
of the trial court that the defendant had converted the bulldozer, the 
§3.5. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 699, 216 N.E.2d 105. 
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Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that a default had occurred, 
giving the plaintiff "the right to take possession of the collateral" and 
"to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of it."2 This right to possession on 
the part of the plaintiff formed the basis for the plaintiff's claim for 
conversion. The Court concluded that the defendant's purchase and 
retention of the bulldozer constituted a conversion which began on 
September 22, 1963, the date of his trade with Vivace.s The Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the trial court's findings in all respects, stating 
that if the result of the judge's finding was to pay the plaintiff more 
than was owed it on the debt secured by the bulldozer, then any prin-
cipal amount beyond the debt is returnable to Vivace, the debtor.4 
§3.6. Equitable mortgage. In Allen v. Mutual Acceptance Corpo1 
the plaintiffs on April 10, 1961, began negotiations with the defendant 
to obtain funds to pay arrearages on two mortgages on their houses 
and to pay other obligations. The unpaid balance on the first mortgage 
was $12,976.07 and on the second mortgage $3265.85. There were 
several other liens. Foreclosure proceedings had been commenced on 
the second mortgage. The terms and conditions of a proposed loan 
were discussed by the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant's 
officer told the plaintiffs that an advance would be made to pay the 
arrearages on the two mortgages and to take care of other small obliga-
tions and that the defendant would assume both mortgages and con· 
tinue to make payments to the mortgagees on the condition that the 
plaintiffs transfer the property by deed. It was also agreed that the 
defendant would lease back the entire premises to the plaintiffs for a 
term of years at a fixed rental. The defendant orally informed the 
plaintiffs that it would reconvey the premises whenever the plaintiffs 
were able to repay the money that the defendant would payout on 
their behalf. Services charges were also discussed and were incor-
porated into the provisions of the lease. 
On April 29, 1961, the plaintiffs conveyed the premises to the 
defendants by a deed reciting that the consideration for the con-
veyance was such that no revenue stamps were required. At the time 
of the conveyance the fair market value of the premises was $18,500. 
On May 10, 1961, the defendant gave the plaintiffs back a lease of the 
premises for fifteen years at a rental which would aggregate $34,840 
2 G.L., c. 106, §§9-503, 9-504. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, 
Inc., 343 Mass. 622, 628, 180 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §8.3; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.3. 
S Lehan v. North Main St. Garage, Inc., 312 Mass. 547, 548, 45 N.E.2d 945, 946 
(1942); Donohue v. Leventhal, 302 Mass. 393, 394, 19 N.E.2d 544, 545-546 (1939); 
New England Road Machinery Co. v. Quincy Oil Co., 290 Mass. 242, 243-244, 195 
N.E. 308, 308-309 (1935); Restatement of Torts Second §223(d), (g) and §229 (1965). 
4 Equitable Credit Corp. v. Treadwell, 338 Mass. 99, 102-103, 153 N.E.2d 882, 884-
885 (1958), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.2; Bell Finance Co. v. Gefter, 
337 Mass. 69, 72-73, 147 N.E.2d 815, 816-817 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§3.2, 7.2, 9.1, 18.10; W. & R. Investment Co. v. Edwards Supply Co., 304 Mass. 
650, 652, 24 N.E.2d 518, 520 (1939). 
§3.6. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 591, 215 N.E.2d 784. 
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over the entire term of the lease. The lessees were given the option 
"to purchase ... at the conclusion of the terms of the lease for the 
price of $2,000.00."2 In 1962 the plaintiffs requested and received a 
payoff figure, but because the parties could not agree upon a tax item, 
the money due to the defendant was not paid and the parties con-
tinued under the arrangements entered into in April and May of 1961. 
On February 27 and again on March 10, 1964, while in arrears in 
monthly payments, the plaintiffs in writing demanded an itemized 
statement of money owed and indicated they were ready and willing 
to make payment. The defendant did not reply and on March II, 
1964, began eviction proceedings. The plaintiffs then owed rent ar-
rearages of $960.00 under the lease. The plaintiffs sought to pay the 
loan. 
The Court held that this was a loan transaction and that the deed 
and lease constituted an equitable mortgage. Whether a deed absolute 
in form is an equitable mortgage depends upon the intention of the 
parties as shown in the circumstances of its negotiations and execu-
tion.s The Court stated that the intention of the parties when the 
documents were executed was determinative of the nature of the 
transaction and the conduct of both parties thereafter in negotiating 
for repayment to the defendant was confirmation of the original in-
tention of an advance on security.4 The plaintiffs could enforce the 
defendant's oral undertaking to reconvey and this could be enforced 
before the expiration of the term of the lease on payment of the 
defendant's advances and charges,1> even though the option to repur-
chase in the lease became effective only at the expiration of the term 
of the lease. The sale and the lease of real estate not being the domi-
nant intent of the parties, neither the statute of frauds nor the parol 
evidence rules prevented enforcing the basic loan transaction and the 
oral agreement by the defendant to recover the property.6 
§3.7. Small Loans Act: Time sale. In Commonwealth v. Security 
Acceptance Corp.l the defendants, Security Acceptance Corporation 
and Tilo Company, were indicted for violating the Small Loans Act.2 
The trial judge without decision reported the case for determination 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
On August 16, 1961, a sales representative of Tilo contracted with 
2Id. at 593, 215 N.E.2d at 786. 
s Murley v. Murley, 334 Mass. 627, 630, 631, 137 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1956), noted in 
1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §20.1; Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 143-145 
(1872). 
4 Murley v. Murley, 334 Mass. 627, 631, 137 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1956), 1957 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law $20.1. 
!I Ibid. 
6 Sears v. Gilman, 199 Mass. 384, 392-393, 85 N.E. 466, 467 (1908); Jennings v. 
Demmon, 194 Mass. 108, 112, 80 N.E. 471 (1907); Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 
130, 142-143 (1872). 
§3.7. 1350 Mass. 159, 214 N.E.2d 47 (1966), also noted in §6.3 infra. 
2 G.L., c. 140, §96. 
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the Stallings for the sale of a composition-type siding to be applied 
to their home at a cash price of $1900 for materials and labor. The 
Stallings indicated their inability to make the monthly payments 
because of other existing indebtedness of approximately $700 owed to 
Bristol Acceptance Corporation. The sales representative for Tilo 
proposed to advance $700 to the Stallings to liquidate their indebted-
ness to Bristol. The Stallings agreed and signed a note for $4153.80,3 
payable in 84 monthly installments of $49.45 each. The sales repre-
sentative determined the amount of the monthly installments by 
looking up the figure for $26004 at 84 months in the interest chart 
provided by Security to Tilo. Security agreed to purchase the note 
subject to completion of the work by Tilo and the advance by Tilo 
of the $700. After the work was completed, Security purchased the 
note from Tilo for $2600. Tilo endorsed the note expressly limiting 
its liability to $1900. Tilo and Security have engaged in two or more 
previous transactions similar in all respects to the one in question. 
Neither corporation was licensed under the provisions of General 
Laws, Chapter 140, Sections 96-114. 
The Commonwealth contended that Tilo with Security's assistance 
made a loan of $700 at a rate of interest greater than the 12 per cent 
per annum statutory limit, and that the limitation of liability to $1900 
in the endorsement by Tilo to Security showed that the defendants 
understood the cash advance and the payment for the siding to be 
separate transactions. It was then argued that the purchase and installa-
tion of the siding was a "time sale" and not a "loan" and that pay-
ment for the siding could not be considered in determining the amount 
of the loan. The defendants argued, in turn, that this transaction 
constituted a single time sales transaction, such sales not coming 
within the purview of the Small Loans Act. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the defendants' argument 
and held that the payment for the siding and the repayment of the 
advance were not separate, distinct transactions. The note contained 
no allocation of the payments as between the amount due for the 
siding and the amount due for the advance to the Stallings to pay 
their pre-existing indebtedness. The advance was made to enable the 
buyer to pay for the siding and thus it became an integral part of 
the transaction. The fact that the value received for the note con-
sisted of separate items does not prove that they were separate trans-
actions.5 The exclusion of "time sales" from the small loans act 
permits a finance charge on the goods sold in excess of the allowable 
interest on small loans.6 
3 The amount of this note was determined on a discount basis, $2600 plus interest. 
4 $1900 basic price plus $700. 
5 Skinner v. Kapples, 320 Mass. 269, 69 N.E.2d 1 (1946); Skinner v. Cederberg, 
317 Mass. 773, 60 N.E.2d 92 (1945). 
6 Uni-Serv Corp. of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Banks, 349 Mass. 283, 285, 
207 N.E.2d 906, 907 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.1. 
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§3.8. Mortgage loans: Confidential fiduciary relationship. In 
Bromfield v. Kosow1 the Supreme Judicial Court had occasion to 
consider the effect of a confidential relationship between a mortgage 
lender and borrower. The suit was brought by the plaintiff, seeking 
an accounting and attempting to establish a trust on certain funds 
allegedly withheld or diverted by the defendant in excess of the cost 
of construction work performed by him. The plaintiff was the receiver 
of a rest home. The owner of all the capital stock of the home was 
also the owner of all the capital stock of five other corporations also 
operating nursing homes. 
The defendant was a principal stockholder in charge of the opera-
tion of another defendant, a small business investment corporation 
licensed under the Federal Small Business Investment Act. The six 
nursing homes had an approximate total of 400 beds and a gross 
annual revenue running between $750,000 and $850,000. For approxi-
mately two years prior to January, 1962, the nursing homes had bor-
rowed money from the defendant, and in 1958 the six nursing homes 
borrowed $700,000 from the defendant. For that loan, they had ex-
ecuted a note in the sum of $1,292,084.67 secured by mortgages on 
all of the real estate owned by the six nursing homes. 
In January, 1960, the particular home here involved did not· meet 
the standards of the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety and 
Public Health. The owner was unable to procure bank financing to 
pay for the required alterations. He also wished to build an addition 
to the home to increase its volume of business, and applied to the 
defendant for a loan for both purposes. The defendant offered to 
obtain a contractor who would build the addition at the best possible 
price with the cost of construction to be met by a loan from one of 
the defendant's companies. The defendant eventually informed the 
home that he had a contractor who would construct the addition for 
$141,661. The bill alleged that the defendant knew without question 
that the entire work of the addition and alterations would cost not 
more than $80,000. The defendant told the home that in the event 
the total construction cost was less than $141,661 he would give the 
home a "breakdown." He led the home to understand that he would 
give it an accounting at the conclusion of the work and would give it 
credit for any excess. 
On June 15, 1960, a formal written construction contract was 
signed. Concurrently the six rest homes executed and delivered six 
notes and six real estate mortgages securing the notes representing the 
loan from the defendant investment corporation. Three of these notes 
were for $30,000, two were for $20,000, and a sixth for a lesser amount. 
Checks from the investment corporation in the amount of the respec-
tive loans were given to the owner and he immediately endorsed each 
one over to the contractor who deposited them after endorsement in 
his own bank account. Five days thereafter the contractor drew a check 
§3.8. 1349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965). 
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on his bank in the amount of $141,661, the total amount of the loan, 
payable to a family venture owned by the defendant. The rate of 
interest on each of the several loans to the six nursing home corpora-
tions was 15 per cent per annum. At the time the loans were made 
there was in existence a government regulation prohibiting a loan as 
large as $141,661 from the investment corporation to any single 
borrower. 
The work required by the construction contract was performed 
satisfactorily and as it progressed either the contractor paid its costs 
and was reimbursed by the defendant or payment was made directly 
by the defendant who also made arrangements for all subcontracts. 
The cost of the construction work was $63,124.35. 
The home relied on the good faith of the defendant. Despite his 
promise to give an accounting, the defendant never disclosed to the 
home what happened to the funds. The contractor was at all times 
acting for and under the direction of the defendant. The contractor 
was aware from the first that the cost of the work would be approxi-
mately $63,000, but under the direction of the defendant he signed a 
contract for $141,661, subsequently turning the entire amount over to 
the defendant. The contractor was paid $63,124.35 in full by the 
defend;mt. There was no fiduciary relationship between the con-
tractor and the home. 
On November 27, 1961, the investment corporation sold the six 
notes and mortgages to another corporation for an amount equal to 
the balance then due. This corporation simultaneously sold the six 
notes to the defendant's family venture for $50,000 and a promissory 
note for $79,661. The venture sold them to another party on the same 
date for his note in the amount of $129,661. A foreclosure of the 
mortgages ensued and the equities in the properties were sold to the 
then holder of the mortgages for $2500 each. The sale resulted in gross 
deficiencies of $122,062, plus foreclosure costs. These remain unpaid. 
Title to the mortgaged nursing homes was eventually acquired by an 
independent corporation not connected with this litigation. 
The trial judge found that, in connection with the making of the 
loan and the construction of the addition, the home reposed trust and 
confidence in the defendant and that the influence growing out of that 
trust and confidence was exerted by the defendant to obtain a personal 
advantage at the expense of the home. The defendant argued that 
since the home sought him for financing and since all parties were 
businessmen, their relationship could not be fiduciary in character.2 
Thus, he argued that when business is the basis of the parties' relation-
2 See Rockland Atlas National Bank v. Barry, 336 Mass. 220, 223, 143 N.E.2d 534, 
536 (1957); National Shawmut Bank v. Hallett 322 Mass. 596, 602·603, 78 N.E.2d 
624,628·629 (1948); Yamins v. Zeitz, 322 Mass. 268, 272, 76 N.E.2d 769, 771-772 (1948); 
Plumer v. Luce, 310 Mass. 789, 798-799, 39 N.E.2d 961, 966 (1942); Snow v. Mer-
chants National Bank, 309 Mass. 354, 360, 35 N.E.2d 213, 216-217 (1941); Cranwell 
v. Oglesby, 299 Mass. 148, 152-153, 12 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1937); Comstock v. Livingston, 
210 Mass. 581, 584, 97 N.E. 106, 108 (1912). 
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ship, mutual respect and confidence cannot make their relations a 
fiduciary one. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument. It 
agreed that the plaintiff alone, by reposing trust and confidence in the 
defendant, could not thereby unilaterally transform a business rela-
tionship into one which was fiduciary in nature. The change in 
relationship from a business transaction to a fiduciary transaction 
could occur only when the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's 
reliance upon him. The Court held that there was a confidential 
relationship in making this loan and that the defendant knew the 
plaintiff was relying on him. The defendant had made an intensive 
study of the nursing homes and had obtained personal first-hand 
knowledge of them. There was a close business relationship and 
business friendship between the parties. The defendant told the home 
that the addition would costs approximately $140,000 when he knew it 
would costs at least $60,000 less. All documents signed by the home 
were prepared by counsel retained by the defendant. The home relied 
on the defendant's good faith in placing the proceeds of the loans in 
his hands. 
The defendant had argued that the parol evidence rule excluded 
any statement made by the defendant prior to the execution of the 
contract, but the Court held that fraud, misrepresentation, and im-
proper dealings by a fiduciary are still operative even if the fraud took 
place prior to the execution of the contract.3 
The loan was for $141,661. The cost of satisfactory construction of 
the addition was $63,124.35. The defendant was held to be construc-
tive trustee for the difference of $78,536.65, together with interest on 
this sum for the period of time he held it.4 
§3.9. Loan collateral: Fraudulent conveyance. The case of Ameri-
can Fidelity Company v. H arney1 showed that excess collateral given 
for a loan by a person already in debt may be attached by an unsecured 
creditor as a fraudulent conveyance. The final decree of the trial court 
had established an indebtedness of $417,571.93 from Betty Harney and 
her husband to the plaintiff as a result of three indemnity bonds exe-
cuted on February 23, April 13, and May 16, 1950. At all material 
times, Betty Harney's only asset was her interest in the estate of her 
father. The plaintiff sought to reach and apply the defendant's interest 
in the estate of her father and to set aside as constructively fraudulent2 
3 Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 182, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (1941). 
4 Yurkanis v. Yurkanis, 321 Mass. 375, 379-380, 73 N.E.2d 598, 600-601 (1947); 
Hubrite Informal Frocks, Inc. v. Kramer, 297 Mass. 530, 535, 9 N.E.2d 570, 573 
(1937); Alden Brothers Co. v. Dunn, 264 Mass. 355, 363, 162 N.E. 773, 775 (1928). 
§3.9. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 217 N.E.2d 905. 
2 The applicable statutes are G.L., c. lO9A, §§3, 4. Section 3 provides: "Fair con-
sideration is given for property or obligation ..• (b) When such property or ob-
ligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt 
in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property 
or obligation obtained." Section 4 reads: "Every conveyance made and every obli-
gation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudu-
lent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made 
or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." 
I 
J 
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the assignments of that interest to the defendants, Bernard D. Phillips 
and Lester M. Phillips, as collateral security for loans totalling 
$296,700 less certain discounts. 
The master found that the loans made by the Phillips were made in 
good faith and that the Phillips did not know of the indemnity agree-
ments. The Supreme Judicial Court sent the case back to the trial 
court to determine whether the Phillips gave a "fair consideration" for 
the security assignments, and thus the case did not give a final answer 
for this problem. If the plaintiff is ultimately successful in showing 
that the transfer of collateral constituted a fraudulent conveyance, the 
result will be that the claims of the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor 
will come in ahead of claims of the Phillips who took security for their 
loans. This case shows the importance of securing a credit report and 
statement of financial condition before making secured loans. If the 
credit report and financial statement contain any indication that the 
debtor may be rendered insolvent as a result of giving the collateral, 
then the proposed loan must be carefully analyzed to make certain 
that the giving of the loan constitutes "fair consideration" for the 
collateral. 
While cases hold that transfers for security of property worth much 
more than the loan are not unfair and do not constitute fraudulent 
conveyances,3 the Supreme Judicial Court has held that the decided 
cases can give only general guidance. These cases do not show that a 
great spread between the value of the collateral and amount of the 
loan is necessarily justified if the risks of the loan are small or if the 
lenders have taken a substantial interest in the corpus of the security 
above the amount advanced. The Court directed that the case be re-
committed to the master for the taking of further evidence and 
findings as to the fairness of the transfers, the amount of the interests 
of the Phillips in the property,4 and a determination of the risk of loss 
in the loans made. 
§3.10. Small loans: Void notes. In Medeiros v. Scarpitti Invest-
ment Corp.1 an heir of the late John Souza sought by bill in equity to 
obtain the discharge of a mortgage, on real estate in which she now has 
an interest, given by Souza to the defendant (Scarpitti) to secure a note 
of September 21, 1955, for $350 "with'interest at ... two per cent per 
month payable monthly." The mortage was also "to secure any future 
indebtedness." Scarpitti, which was not licensed to make small loans,2 
3 Bianco v. Lay, 313 Mass. 444, 449-454, 48 N.E.2d 36, 39-41 (1943), and the cases 
cited therein. See also Troll v. Chase National Bank, 257 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1958). 
See Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 404, 
409-412 (1930). In Oshry v. Haddad, 265 Mass. 199, 202, 164 N.E. 69, 70-71 (1928), 
$6000 as against $2367.61 was considered "disproportionately small," but the mort-
gagee could have been found to be acting in good faith. 
4 G.L., c. 109A, §9(2); Thomas v. Beals, 154 Mass. 51, 54, 27 N.E. 1004, 1005 (1891); 
Ripley v. Severance, 6 Pick. 474, 477-478 (1828); Note, 79 A.L.R. 132, 138 et seq. 
(1932). 
§3.1O. 1349 Mass. 775, 212 N.E.2d 475 (1965). 
2 G.L., c. 140, §96, as amended by Acts of 1941, c. 158, §l. 
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later received from Souza on the same terms, several notes, each for less 
than $300, secured by the same mortgage. Souza paid Scarpitti a total 
of $937.14. There was no evidence that he specified how the payments 
were to be applied. The plaintiff on December 21, 1962, offered to pay 
to Scarpitti $947.94 at a time when there was owing on the first note 
for $350 (apart from Scarpitti's payments just mentioned) the whole 
principal and $609 of interest. 
The Supreme Judicial Court overruled exceptions and held that the 
trial judge's subsidiary findings in the report of material facts justified 
him in concluding that each of the later notes for less than $300 was a 
separate loan and wholly void;3 that the plaintiff's tender stopped the 
running of interest; that Scarpitti could not apply Souza's payments to 
the void notes4 and the interest thereon even though they purported 
to be secured by the same mortgage; and that the plaintiff was en-
titled to a discharge of the mortgage upon paying the balance due on 
the $350 note with interest, less the amount of Souza's own payments. 
§3.11. Second mortgage residential loans. In Pollan v. Hoffman,! 
the plaintiff's bill in equity sought relief against Hoffman, as mort-
gagee, with respect to their notes to him secured by a second mortgage 
on their residence and by a chattel mortgage. The notes did not dis-
close, as separate items, the principal loan, "the rate of interest or its 
equivalent in money, the period of the loan and the periodic due dates, 
if any, of principal and interest."2 In the absence of the required 
separate disclosures, a lender upon notes, representing a loan of more 
than $1500, secured by a junior mortgage of certain residential real 
estate assessed for "not over" $10,000,3 "shall have no right to collect 
interest."4 
Hoffman realized $17,000 by foreclosure of the second mortgage and 
$2100 by foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Taking into account 
various other payments by the mortgagors and amounts paid out by 
Hoffman, the trial judge ordered the entry of a decree that Hoffman 
pay to the plaintiffs the difference between (a) the aggregate amounts 
realized by him by the foreclosures or paid to him by the plaintiffs, and 
(b) the principal amount of the loan and proper expenses paid out by 
him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed this decree. 
3 See G.L., c. 140, §103, revised by Acts of 1962, c. 351, §1; Bernhardt v. Atlantic 
Finance Co., 311 Mass. 183, 187-191, 40 N.E.2d 713, 715-717 (1942). See also Thomas 
v. Burnce, 223 Mass. 311, 111 N.E. 871 (1916); cf. Skinner v. Kapples, 320 Mass. 269, 
271, 69 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1946). 
4 See Bondy v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44, 48, 102 N.E. 935, 936 (1913); Rohan v. Han-
son, 11 Cush. 44,47-48 (1853); cf. Carlson v. Lawrence H. Oppenheim Co., 334 Mass. 
462,464-465, 136 N.E.2d 205, 206-207 (1956), where void notes do not appear to have 
been involved. 
··§3.11. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 84, 213 N.E.2d 406. 
2Ibid. See G.L., c. 140, §90B, inserted by Acts of 1959, c. 505, §l. See also id. 
§90A, as amended by Acts of 1960, c. 446, since amended by Acts of 1962, c. 286. 
3 G.L., c. 140, §90A. 
4Id. §90B. 
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§3.12. Mortgage foreclosure: Summary process. In Wayne Invest-
ment Corp. v. Abbott1 summary process was brought by a mortgagee 
after foreclosure sale to secure possession of the mortgaged premises. 
The Court held that questions of good faith in the foreclosure sale 
could not be raised in the summary process action. 
§3.13. Retail Installment Sales and Services Act. This act,l which 
in many ways revolutionizes the procedures and practices in the 
revolving credit and installment sale agreement field, is discussed in 
detail in a separate chapter of this SURVEy.2 
§3.14. Truth in Lending law. This statute,l reflecting the same 
legislative policy that caused adoption of the Retail Installment Sales 
Act, is also discussed in the same chapter in this SURVEy.2 
§3.15. Mortgage loan limits. The General Court this 1966 SURVEY 
year liberalized mortgage loan limits for savings banks1 and trust 
companies.2 
§3.l2. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 628, 215 N.E.2d 795. 
§3.l3. 1 Acts of 1966. c. 284. adding Chapter 255D to the General Laws. 
2 See chapter 7 infra. 
§3.14. 1 Acts of 1966. c. 587. 
2 See chapter 7 infra. 
§3.l5. 1 Acts of 1966. c. 218. 
2 Id .• c. 220. 
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